Baseball Salaries and Income Taxes: The "Home Field Advantage" of Income Taxes on Free Agent Salaries
In this paper we examine the impact on the salaries of free agents in Major League Baseball of differences in state and local individual income taxes between major league cities, in an attempt to see if income taxes affect player salaries. Our basic specification suggests that each percentage point of an income tax raises free agent salaries by $21 to $24 thousand; other estimates indicate even larger impacts. Our findings suggest that the existence of this additional salary demand means that low tax cities (e.g., Florida, Texas, and Washington) have a "home field advantage" in the baseball free agent market.
|Date of creation:||Jul 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (504) 865-5321
Fax: (504) 865-5869
Web page: http://econ.tulane.edu
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- J. A. Hausman, 1976.
"Specification Tests in Econometrics,"
185, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Kenneth H. Brown & Lisa K. Jepsen, 2009. "The Impact of Team Revenues on MLB Salaries," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 10(2), pages 192-203, April.
- Jon Bakija & Joel Slemrod, 2004.
"Do the Rich Flee from High State Taxes? Evidence from Federal Estate Tax Returns,"
Department of Economics Working Papers
2004-12, Department of Economics, Williams College.
- Jon Bakija & Joel Slemrod, 2004. "Do the Rich Flee from High State Taxes? Evidence from Federal Estate Tax Returns," NBER Working Papers 10645, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Austan Goolsbee, 2000.
"What Happens When You Tax the Rich? Evidence from Executive Compensation,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 352-378, April.
- Austan Goolsbee, 1997. "What Happens When You Tax the Rich? Evidence from Executive Compensation," NBER Working Papers 6333, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tul:wpaper:1209. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Keith Finlay)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.