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Verified Reassurance and Conflict Cycles

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  • Gyarmathy, Andrei
  • Lukyanov, Georgy

Abstract

Peaceful conduct can appear hostile, yet verbal reassurance is least credible when mistrust is greatest. We study a limited-memory conflict model in which an actor whose dovish action is perceived as hostile can pay for truthful, nonforgeable clarification. Because evidence changes a normal opponent’s response but not a committed-hostile opponent’s, verification incentives fall with mistrust—a reassurance drought that sustains conflict cycles between normal groups. Better verification weakly reduces conflict onset and prevalence, but may lengthen the entire duration distribution: once innocent mistakes are more often resolved, an adverse record that remains is more diagnostic of hostility. This distinction changes mediation design. Support during peace can lengthen conflict and reduce conditional normal–normal welfare within the interior stationary regime. Support activated during unresolved conflict lowers prevalence, shortens every duration quantile, and raises welfare when its conflict-reduction benefit exceeds induced resource costs. Effective reassurance policy should therefore target recovery.

Suggested Citation

  • Gyarmathy, Andrei & Lukyanov, Georgy, 2026. "Verified Reassurance and Conflict Cycles," TSE Working Papers 26-1712, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Oct 2026.
    • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:131434
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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