IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/intecj/v19y2005i3p397-416.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A theory of efficient coexistence

Author

Listed:
  • Shyh-fang Ueng

Abstract

Neighbours have to coexist over an infinite horizon. Neither of them can eradicate the other or extricate him or herself from the bondage. Their respective resources regenerate themselves periodically. Hence, the capacities for production and war repeatedly recuperate from exhaustion. This paper uses a simple dynamic model to study the cooperation and conflict between two neighbours. It is shown that the way for one party to enhance its own prosperity without inducing a war with its neighbour is to collaborate on mutually beneficial projects and divide the output according to each side's contribution. Rejecting potential collaboration or dividing the joint output disproportionately risks the eruption of war. If the duration that one side is prepared to fight exceeds that of the other, the one with a shorter duration will concede defeat before the war starts. Nonetheless, when the planned durations of war of both sides are identical, the first-strike advantage induces them to wage war simultaneously.

Suggested Citation

  • Shyh-fang Ueng, 2005. "A theory of efficient coexistence," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(3), pages 397-416.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:intecj:v:19:y:2005:i:3:p:397-416
    DOI: 10.1080/10168730500199574
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10168730500199574
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/10168730500199574?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjöström, 2004. "Arms Races and Negotiations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(2), pages 351-369.
    2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    3. Muthoo, Abhinay, 2004. "A model of the origins of basic property rights," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 288-312, November.
    4. Lopomo, Giuseppe & Ok, Efe A, 2001. "Bargaining, Interdependence, and the Rationality of Fair Division," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(2), pages 263-283, Summer.
    5. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    6. Young H. P., 1993. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 145-168, February.
    7. Hirshleifer,Jack, 2001. "The Dark Side of the Force," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521804127.
    8. Robert Bates & Avner Greif & Smita Singh, 2002. "Organizing Violence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(5), pages 599-628, October.
    9. Fearon, James D., 1995. "Rationalist explanations for war," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(3), pages 379-414, July.
    10. Kindleberger, Charles P., 1991. "The Economic Crisis of 1619 to 1623," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(1), pages 149-175, March.
    11. Elisha A. Pazner & David Schmeidler, 1978. "Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 92(4), pages 671-687.
    12. Hirshleifer,Jack, 2001. "The Dark Side of the Force," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521009171.
    13. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    14. Cobbs, Elizabeth A., 1989. "Entrepreneurship as Diplomacy: Nelson Rockefeller and the Development of the Brazilian Capital Market," Business History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 88-121, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry & Young, Peyton, 2003. "Equilibrium selection in bargaining models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 296-328, November.
    2. Stergios Skaperdas, 2003. "Restraining the Genuine Homo Economicus: Why the Economy Cannot Be Divorced from Its Governance," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(2), pages 135-162, July.
    3. Widgren, Mika & Napel, Stefan, 2003. "EU Conciliation Committee: Council 56 versus Parliament 6," CEPR Discussion Papers 4071, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2003. "Bargaining and Distribution of Power in the EU's Conciliation Committee," CESifo Working Paper Series 1029, CESifo.
    5. Rebelo, S., 1997. "On the Determinant of Economic Growth," RCER Working Papers 443, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    6. Sawa, Ryoji, 2021. "A prospect theory Nash bargaining solution and its stochastic stability," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 692-711.
    7. Dario Maimone Ansaldo Patti & Pietro Navarra & Giuseppe Sobbrio, 2022. "Insecure Property Rights and Conflicts: How to Solve Them?," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(1), pages 1-32, December.
    8. Andersson, Ola & Argenton, Cédric & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2018. "Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 1-5.
    9. Britz, V. & Herings, P.J.J. & Predtetchinski, A., 2012. "On the convergence to the Nash bargaining solution for endogenous bargaining protocols," Research Memorandum 030, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    10. Christopher Blattman, 2009. "Civil War: A Review of Fifty Years of Research," Working Papers id:2231, eSocialSciences.
    11. Harstad, Bård, 2021. "A Theory of Pledge-and-Review Bargaining," Memorandum 5/2022, Oslo University, Department of Economics, revised 21 Jun 2021.
    12. Guth, Werner & Ritzberger, Klaus & van Damme, Eric, 2004. "On the Nash bargaining solution with noise," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 697-713, June.
    13. Raul Caruso, 2008. "Reciprocity in the shadow of threat," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 55(1), pages 91-111, April.
    14. Nejat Anbarci & Nick Feltovich, 2013. "How sensitive are bargaining outcomes to changes in disagreement payoffs?," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(4), pages 560-596, December.
    15. Federica Alberti & Sven Fischer & Werner Güth & Kei Tsutsui, 2018. "Concession Bargaining," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 62(9), pages 2017-2039, October.
    16. Jonathan Shalev, 2002. "Loss Aversion and Bargaining," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 201-232, May.
    17. Ellingsen, Tore & Robles, Jack, 2002. "Does Evolution Solve the Hold-Up Problem?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 28-53, April.
    18. Britz, Volker & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2010. "Non-cooperative support for the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(5), pages 1951-1967, September.
    19. Yuni Xu & Xiang Fu & Xuefeng Chu, 2019. "Analyzing the Impacts of Climate Change on Hydro-Environmental Conflict-Resolution Management," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 33(4), pages 1591-1607, March.
    20. Giuseppe Attanasi & Aurora García Gallego & Nikolaos Georgantzís & Aldo Montesano, 2010. "Non-cooperative games with chained confirmed proposals," LERNA Working Papers 10.02.308, LERNA, University of Toulouse.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:intecj:v:19:y:2005:i:3:p:397-416. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/RIEJ20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.