An explicit bound on epsilon for nonemptiness of Epsilon-cores of games
We consider parameterized collections of games without side payments and determine a bound on epsilon so that all suffciently large games in the collection have non-empty epsilon-cores. Our result makes explicit the relationship between the required size of epsilon for non-emptiness of the epsilon-core, the parameters describing the collection of games, and the size of the total player set. Given the parameters describing the collection, the larger the game, the smaller the epsilon that can be chosen.
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- Herbert E. Scarf, 1965. "The Core of an N Person Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 182R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Mamoru Kaneko & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1982.
"Cores of Partitioning Games,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
620, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Kaneko, Mamoru & Wooders, Myrna Holtz, 1996. "The Nonemptiness of the f-Core of a Game without Side Payments," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 25(2), pages 245-258.
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