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Candidate Exit and Voter Loyalty during Early Democratization

Author

Listed:
  • Torun Dewan

    (Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science)

  • Christopher Kam

    (Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia)

  • Jaakko Meriläinen

    (Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

  • Janne Tukiainen

    (Department of Economics, University of Turku)

Abstract

Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970) proposed that organiza tions persist when loyalty tempers incentives to exit after adverse shocks. We test this argument using newly digitized individual-level voting records from 28 English constituencies (1832-1868), covering 134,000 real votes. Voters could exit by switching parties, use voice by splitting their two votes between opposing parties, or remain loyal. Exploiting favorite candidates’ exit as a negative shock to the choice set, we show that candidate exits increased party switching more than expressing voice. We show that candidate exit initially induces substantial voter exit and voice, especially among Liberal voters, but that these responses attenuate sharply by the mid-1860s, consistent with the consolidation of party organizations and the emergence of durable partisan loyalty.

Suggested Citation

  • Torun Dewan & Christopher Kam & Jaakko Meriläinen & Janne Tukiainen, 2026. "Candidate Exit and Voter Loyalty during Early Democratization," Discussion Papers 178, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp178
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • P00 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - General - - - General

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