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Organizational choice and entry deterrence

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  • Hendrikse, G.W.J.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

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Suggested Citation

  • Hendrikse, G.W.J., 1989. "Organizational choice and entry deterrence," Other publications TiSEM c4b7dfb8-3f1f-4d9c-b35d-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:c4b7dfb8-3f1f-4d9c-b35d-694620de8cc2
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    File URL: https://repository.tilburguniversity.edu/bitstreams/32a3d42d-2d4b-42b2-b274-f14f2dc03050/download
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Caves, Richard E, 1980. "Industrial Organization, Corporate Strategy and Structure," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 64-92, March.
    2. Brander, James A & Eaton, Jonathan, 1984. "Product Line Rivalry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 323-334, June.
    3. Townsend, Robert M, 1987. "Economic Organization with Limited Communication," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 954-971, December.
    4. Sah, Raaj Kumar & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1986. "The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 716-727, September.
    5. Hendrikse, G.W.J., 1988. "Organizational Choice : Product, Function or Matrix?," Other publications TiSEM 48e6906a-3926-418e-9f88-9, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
    7. Oliver D. Hart, 1983. "The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 366-382, Autumn.
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