IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tin/wpaper/20260069.html

Blockchains and Strategic Secondary Censorship

Author

Listed:
  • Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou

    (Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas)

  • Maarten R.C. van Oordt

    (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)

Abstract

Censorship resistance is often considered to be a core attribute of distributed ledgers. Censorship resistance refers to the inability to selectively exclude technically valid but undesirable transactions from the blockchain. We examine blockchain censorship in a game-theoretic framework that allows for both primary and secondary censorship. The analysis identifies scenarios in which both inclusion and censorship equilibria exist. Once an equilibrium with strategic secondary censorship is implemented, it may be hard to revert to inclusion: Censorship equilibria are perfectly coalition-proof if the negative impact of an undesirable transaction on block producers is sufficiently large. These results highlight the growing importance of research into methods shaping censorship resistance at the technical layer.

Suggested Citation

  • Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou & Maarten R.C. van Oordt, 2026. "Blockchains and Strategic Secondary Censorship," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 26-069/IV, Tinbergen Institute.
  • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20260069
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://papers.tinbergen.nl/26069.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bruno Biais & Christophe Bisière & Matthieu Bouvard & Catherine Casamatta, 2019. "The Blockchain Folk Theorem," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(5), pages 1662-1715.
    2. Hanna Halaburda & Guillaume Haeringer & Joshua Gans & Neil Gandal, 2022. "The Microeconomics of Cryptocurrencies," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 971-1013, September.
    3. Jonathan Chiu & Thorsten V. Koeppl, 2022. "The economics of cryptocurrency: Bitcoin and beyond," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(4), pages 1762-1798, November.
    4. Fabian Schär & Dario Thürkauf & David Yermack, 2026. "Unruly by Design: Fee Volatility and Strategic Attacks in Bitcoin Mining," NBER Working Papers 35443, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Kahn, Charles M. & Mookherjee, Dilip, 1992. "The good, the bad, and the ugly: Coalition proof equilibrium in infinite games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 101-121, January.
    6. Rodney J. Garratt & Maarten R. C. van Oordt, 2023. "Why Fixed Costs Matter for Proof-of-Work–Based Cryptocurrencies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(11), pages 6482-6507, November.
    7. Capponi, Agostino & Jia, Ruizhe & Wang, Kanye Ye, 2025. "Maximal extractable value and allocative inefficiencies in public blockchains," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).
    8. T. Clifton Morgan & Constantinos Syropoulos & Yoto V. Yotov, 2023. "Economic Sanctions: Evolution, Consequences, and Challenges," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 3-30, Winter.
    9. Yackolley Amoussou-Guenou & Bruno Biais & Maria Potop-Butucaru & Sara Tucci-Piergiovanni, 2024. "Committee-Based Blockchains as Games between Opportunistic Players and Adversaries," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 37(2), pages 409-443.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Garratt, Rodney J. & van Oordt, Maarten R.C., 2026. "The crypto multiplier," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    2. Jacob D. Leshno & Elaine Shi & Rafael Pass, 2024. "On the Viability of Open-Source Financial Rails: Economic Security of Permissionless Consensus," Papers 2409.08951, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2025.
    3. Rodney J. Garratt & Maarten R. C. van Oordt, 2023. "Why Fixed Costs Matter for Proof-of-Work–Based Cryptocurrencies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(11), pages 6482-6507, November.
    4. Joshua S. Gans & Hanna Halaburda, 2023. ""Zero Cost'' Majority Attacks on Permissionless Blockchains," NBER Working Papers 31473, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Joshua S. Gans & Hanna Halaburda, 2024. "“Zero Cost” Majority Attacks on Permissionless Proof of Work Blockchains," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(6), pages 4155-4165, June.
    6. Auer, Raphael & Monnet, Cyril & Shin, Hyun Song, 2025. "Distributed ledgers and the governance of money," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
    7. Jin, Minyue & Zhang, Xinxin & Yue, Xiaohang & Zuo, Qianzhou & Nie, Jiajia, 2025. "Consensus mechanism selection in Web 3.0 blockchain platforms: Proof of Work vs. Proof of Stake," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    8. Castillo León, Jaime & Lehar, Alfred, 2026. "What data have told us about decentralized finance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    9. Zongxi Li & A. Max Reppen & Ronnie Sircar, 2024. "A Mean Field Games Model for Cryptocurrency Mining," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(4), pages 2188-2208, April.
    10. Pavel Ciaian & d'Artis Kancs & Miroslava Rajcaniova, 2021. "Interdependencies between Mining Costs, Mining Rewards and Blockchain Security," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 22(1), pages 25-62, May.
    11. Hokkanen, Topi, 2023. "Externalities and market failures of cryptocurrencies," BoF Economics Review 4/2023, Bank of Finland.
    12. Bruno Biais & Agostino Capponi & Lin William Cong & Vishal Gaur & Kay Giesecke, 2023. "Advances in Blockchain and Crypto Economics," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(11), pages 6417-6426, November.
    13. Bruno, August & Weber, Paige & Yates, Andrew J., 2023. "Can Bitcoin mining increase renewable electricity capacity?," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    14. Michael Sockin & Wei Xiong, 2023. "A Model of Cryptocurrencies," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(11), pages 6684-6707, November.
    15. Alon Benhaim & Brett Hemenway Falk & Gerry Tsoukalas, 2021. "Scaling Blockchains: Can Committee-Based Consensus Help?," Papers 2110.08673, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2022.
    16. Guennewig, Maxi, 2026. "Blockchain congestion facilitates currency competition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 234(C).
    17. Joel Hasbrouck & Thomas J. Rivera & Fahad Saleh, 2026. "An Economic Model of a Decentralized Exchange with Concentrated Liquidity," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 72(5), pages 3666-3683, May.
    18. Ferreira, Daniel & Li, Jin & Nikolowa, Radoslawa, 2023. "Corporate capture of blockchain governance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 115618, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    19. Julien Prat & Benjamin Walter, 2021. "An Equilibrium Model of the Market for Bitcoin Mining," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 129(8), pages 2415-2452.
    20. Katrin Tinn, 2026. "A Theory Model of Digital Currency with Asymmetric Privacy," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 72(5), pages 3699-3719, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20260069. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Tinbergen Office +31 (0)10-4088900 (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/tinbenl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.