Increasing Marginal Revenue and Demand Elasticity
If social “harm” is an inverse-U function against the degree of control of illicit drug markets, and if revenue can proxy “harm,” what demand functions result in increasing marginal revenue?
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- Liu, Jin-Long & Liu, Jin-Tan & Hammitt, James K. & Chou, Shin-Yi, 1999. "The price elasticity of opium in Taiwan, 1914-1942," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 795-810, December.
- Anne Line Bretteville-Jensen & Erik Bi¯rn, 2003. "Heroin Consumption, Prices and Addiction: Evidence from Self-reported Panel Data," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 105(4), pages 661-679, December.
- Silverman, Lester P. & Spruill, Nancy L., 1977. "Urban crime and the price of heroin," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 80-103, January.
- van Ours, Jan C, 1995. "The Price Elasticity of Hard Drugs: The Case of Opium in the Dutch East Indies, 1923-1938," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(2), pages 261-279, April.
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