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The Combined Effect of Salary Restrictions and Revenue Sharing on Club Profits, Player Salaries, and Competitive Balance

Author

Listed:
  • Helmut Dietl

    () (Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich)

  • Markus Lang

    () (Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich)

  • Alexander Rathke

    () (Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich)

Abstract

This article provides a standard "Fort and Quirk"-style model of a professional team sports league and analyzes the combined effect of salary restrictions (caps and floors) and revenue-sharing arrangements. It shows that the invariance proposition does not hold even under Walrasian conjectures if revenue sharing is combined with either a salary cap or a salary floor. In leagues with a binding salary cap for large clubs but no binding salary floor for small clubs, revenue sharing will decrease the competitive balance and increase club profits. Moreover, a salary cap produces a more balanced league and decreases the cost per unit of talent. The effect of a more restrictive salary cap on the profits of the small clubs is positive, whereas the effects on the profits of the large clubs as well as on aggregate profits are ambiguous. In leagues with a binding salary floor for the small clubs but no binding salary cap for the large clubs, revenue sharing will increase the competitive balance. Moreover, revenue sharing will decrease (increase) the profits of large (small) clubs. Implementing a more restrictive salary floor produces a less balanced league and increases the cost per unit of talent. Furthermore, a salary floor will result in lower profits for all clubs.

Suggested Citation

  • Helmut Dietl & Markus Lang & Alexander Rathke, 2009. "The Combined Effect of Salary Restrictions and Revenue Sharing on Club Profits, Player Salaries, and Competitive Balance," Working Papers 0909, International Association of Sports Economists;North American Association of Sports Economists.
  • Handle: RePEc:spe:wpaper:0909
    as

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    File URL: http://web.holycross.edu/RePEc/spe/DietlLangRathke_SalaryCapFloor.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Scott E. Atkinson & Linda R. Stanley & John Tschirhart, 1988. "Revenue Sharing as an Incentive in an Agency Problem: An example from the National Football League," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 27-43, Spring.
    2. Helmut M. Dietl & Markus Lang & Stephan Werner, 2009. "Social Welfare in Sports Leagues with Profit-Maximizing and/or Win-Maximizing Clubs," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 375-396, October.
    3. Cyrenne, Philippe, 2001. "A Quality-of-Play Model of a Professional Sports League," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 39(3), pages 444-452, July.
    4. Dietl Helmut M & Lang Markus & Rathke Alexander, 2009. "The Effect of Salary Caps in Professional Team Sports on Social Welfare," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-23, April.
    5. Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 101-112, November.
    6. Rodney Fort & James Quirk, 1995. "Cross-subsidization, Incentives, and Outcomes in Professional Team Sports Leagues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 33(3), pages 1265-1299, September.
    7. El-Hodiri, Mohamed & Quirk, James, 1971. "An Economic Model of a Professional Sports League," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(6), pages 1302-1319, Nov.-Dec..
    8. Idson, Todd L & Kahane, Leo H, 2000. "Team Effects on Compensation: An Application to Salary Determination in the National Hockey League," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(2), pages 345-357, April.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Team sports leagues; invariance proposition; competitive balance; revenue sharing; salary cap; salary floor;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Restaurants; Recreation; Tourism

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