Goal! Profit maximization and win maximization in football leagues
In this paper we estimate the best responses of football clubs to the choices of other clubs in Spanish and English leagues over the period 1994-2004. We find that choices are more closely approximated by win maximization than by profit maximization in both the short term and the long term. We examine club characteristics that might explain variations in choices between Spanish clubs.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.cdes.fr/index.php?id=fr69|
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2006. "A Sceptic's Comment on the Study of Economics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(510), pages C1-C9, 03.
- David Romer, 2006. "Do Firms Maximize? Evidence from Professional Football," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(2), pages 340-365, April.
- Lawrence M. Kahn, 2000. "The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 75-94, Summer.
- SZYMANSKI, Stefan & KÉSENNE, Stefan, 2003.
"Competitive balance and gate revenue sharing in team sports,"
2003003, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
- Stefan Szymanski & Stefan KÈsenne, 2004. "Competitive balance and gate revenue sharing in team sports," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(1), pages 165-177, 03.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spe:wpaper:0621. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Victor Matheson)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.