Tilting the Playing Field (Why a sports league planner would choose less, not more, competitive balance): The case of English Football
It has traditionally been argued that the organizer of a sports league would prefer more competitive balance to the level that emerges in a noncooperative equilibrium. This argument has been used to justify restraints on competition between teams, which also tend to raise profits at the expense of players and consumers. This paper shows that in theory a planner would prefer less, not more, competitive balance. The paper uses data from the second tier of professional English league football to show just how unbalanced a league planner would choose.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2006|
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- SZYMANSKI, Stefan & KÉSENNE, Stefan, 2003.
"Competitive balance and gate revenue sharing in team sports,"
2003003, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
- Stefan Szymanski & Stefan KÈsenne, 2004. "Competitive balance and gate revenue sharing in team sports," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(1), pages 165-177, 03.
- Martin B. Schmidt & David J. Berri, 2001. "Competitive Balance and Attendance: The Case of Major League Baseball," Journal of Sports Economics, The North American Association of Sports Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 145-167, May.
- Roger Noll, 2002. "The Economics of Promotion and Relegation in Sports Leagues: The Cases of English Football," Journal of Sports Economics, The North American Association of Sports Economists, vol. 3(2), pages 169-203, May.
- Stefan Szymanski, 2003. "The Economic Design of Sporting Contests," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1137-1187, December.
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