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Labor Time Shared In The Assignment Game Lending New Insights To The Theory Of Two-Sided Matching Markets

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Abstract

We consider two two-sided matching markets, where every agent has an amount of units of a divisible good to be distributed among the partnerships he forms and exchanged for money. Both markets have the same sets of feasible allocations but operate under distinct rules. However they are indistinguishable under their representation in the characteristic function form. The adequate and proposed mathematical model provides the foundation to characterize the cooperative equilibrium concept in each market. Setwise-stability is then shown not to be the general definition of stability. The connection between the cooperative structures of these markets and between the cooperative and competitive structures of each market is established, by focusing on the algebraic structure of the core, the set of cooperative equilibrium allocations and the set of competitive equilibrium allocations. The results obtained and the methodology used in their proofs provide new and useful insights to the theory of two-sided matching markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Marilda Sotomayor, 2012. "Labor Time Shared In The Assignment Game Lending New Insights To The Theory Of Two-Sided Matching Markets," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2012_29, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).
    • Handle: RePEc:spa:wpaper:2012wpecon29
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    File URL: http://www.repec.eae.fea.usp.br/documentos/MarildaSotomayor29WP.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alkan, Ahmet & Gale, David, 2003. "Stable schedule matching under revealed preference," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 289-306, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. David Pérez-Castrillo & Marilda Sotomayor, 2017. "On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer–seller markets," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(4), pages 1137-1161, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    stable allocations; core; competitive equilibrium allocations; feasible deviation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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