The National Anticorruption System in Mexico: Ambitious Design, Democratic Backsliding, and the Limits of Reform

Mexico's National Anticorruption System (SNA) was launched with high expectations as a comprehensive framework to curb corruption through institutional coordination and citizen participation. This article analyzes the SNA's design and its implementation to date, highlighting how political dynamics have shaped outcomes. We find that while the SNA's institutional architecture is ambitious – integrating multiple oversight bodies and engaging civil society – its effectiveness has been fundamentally undermined by inconsistent political will and deteriorating democratic governance. Under President Enrique Pena Nieto (2012–2018), the SNA's creation marked a significant reform albeit with uneven commitment. Under President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador (2018–present), the SNA has been deprioritized amid a shift toward centralized, personalized anti-corruption efforts. We document sluggish implementation, especially in Local Anticorruption Systems, resource shortfalls, and deliberate neglect of autonomous institutions. These challenges are exacerbated by broader democratic backsliding, as executive power concentrates and accountability institutions are weakened. Absent a dramatic change in political support, the SNA is unlikely to fulfill its promise, illustrating the limits of institutional reforms in the face of adverse political conditions.