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Cross-modal Computer Games as an Interactive Learning Medium

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  • Asadul Islam

    (Yasar University)

Abstract

Cross-modal computer games are boundless mediums for interactive learning in a visually and graphically simulated interactive sphere. Where the challenges and rewards for the users are constructed according to the increase in difficulty level. This paper will study about the significance of cross-modal based computer games for learning in the context of different visuals and sounds. As the computer games give the user a virtual platform with new learning experiences. In this method of learning the user becomes an independent learner. The computer games can draw player?s attention, team building, feedbacks, interest, time, self-confidence, and desire will also be explored in this research. Furthermore, this research will also explain the current issues faced in the game based learning with positive and negative aspects of this learning process. It will also explain about the different tools to analyze the game based learning. Hence, the game based learning in the curriculum is one of the very beneficial and engaging ways of the learning. It can make learning environment interactive for becoming an independent learner from a dependent learner.

Suggested Citation

  • Asadul Islam, 2017. "Cross-modal Computer Games as an Interactive Learning Medium," Proceedings of International Academic Conferences 5007280, International Institute of Social and Economic Sciences.
  • Handle: RePEc:sek:iacpro:5007280
    as

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    File URL: https://iises.net/proceedings/30th-international-academic-conference-venice/table-of-content/detail?cid=50&iid=017&rid=7280
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    References listed on IDEAS

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