Slightly Altruistic Equilibria in Normal Form Games
We introduce a refinement concept for Nash equilibria (slightly altruistic equilibrium) defined by a limit process and which captures the idea of reciprocal altruism as presented in Binmore (2003). Existence is guaranteed for every finite game and for a large class of games with a continuum of strategies. Results and examples emphasize the (lack of) connections with classical refinement concepts. Finally, it is shown that under a pseudo-monotonicity assumption on a particular operator associated to the game it is possible, by selecting slightly altruistic equilibria, to eliminate those equilibria in which a player can switch to a strategy that is better for the others without leaving the set of equilibria.
|Date of creation:||01 Oct 2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2008, 137(2), 347-362|
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