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Incentive Effects of Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts: Evidence from Chile

  • Gonzalo Reyes Hartley
  • Jan C Van Ours
  • Milan Vodopivec

    ()

    (Studies Division, Chilean Pension Supervisor)

This study examines the determinants of job-finding rates of unemployment benefit recipients under the Chilean program. This is a unique, innovative program that combines social insurance through a solidarity fund (SF) with self-insurance in the form of unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISAs) - so as to mitigate the moral hazard problem of traditional unemployment insurance programs. Our study is the first one to empirically investigate whether UISAs improve work incentives. We find that for beneficiaries using the SF, the pattern of job finding rates over the duration of unemployment is consistent with moral hazard effects, while for beneficiaries relying on UISAs, the pattern is free of such effects. We also find that for benefit recipient not entitled to use the SF, the amount of accumulation on the UISA does not affect the exit rate from unemployment, suggesting that such individuals internalize the costs of unemployment benefits. Our results provide strong support to the idea that UISAs can improve work incentives..

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File URL: http://www.spensiones.cl/redirect/files/doctrab/DT00040.pdf
File Function: Revised version, 2010
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Paper provided by Superintendencia de Pensiones in its series Working Papers with number 40.

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Date of creation: Feb 2010
Date of revision: Feb 2010
Handle: RePEc:sdp:sdpwps:40
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.spensiones.cl/

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  1. Holmlund, Bertil, 1998. " Unemployment Insurance in Theory and Practice," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 100(1), pages 113-41, March.
  2. Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil, 2003. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance Design:Time Limits, Monitoring, or Workfare?," Working Paper Series 2003:17, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  3. Vodopivec, Milan, 2008. "How Viable Are Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts: Simulation Results for Slovenia," IZA Discussion Papers 3438, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Solange Berstein & Eduardo Fajnzylber & Pamela Gana & Isabel Poblete, 2007. "Cinco Años de Funcionamiento del Seguro de Cesantía en Chile," Working Papers 23, Superintendencia de Pensiones, revised Dec 2007.
  5. Lalive, Rafael & van Ours, Jan C. & Zweimüller, Josef, 2004. "How Changes in Financial Incentives Affect the Duration of Unemployment," IZA Discussion Papers 1363, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Matthew Blackwell & Stefano Iacus & Gary King & Giuseppe Porro, 2010. "CEM: Coarsened Exact Matching in Stata," BOS10 Stata Conference 8, Stata Users Group.
  7. Jan C. van Ours & Milan Vodopivec, 2006. "How Shortening the Potential Duration of Unemployment Benefits Affects the Duration of Unemployment: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(2), pages 351-378, April.
  8. Fredriksson, Peter & Holmlund, Bertil, 2003. "Improving incentives in unemployment insurance: A review of recent research," Working Paper Series 2003:5, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  9. Raj Chetty, 2008. "Moral Hazard versus Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 116(2), pages 173-234, 04.
  10. David MARGOLIS, 2008. "“Unemployment Insurance Versus Individual Unemployment Accounts and Transitions to Formal Versus Informal Sector Jobs”," Working Papers 2008-35, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  11. Milan Vodopivec, 2010. "How Viable are Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts? Simulation Results for Slovenia," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 52(2), pages 225-247, June.
  12. Ferrer, Ana & Riddell, W. Craig, 2011. "Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts in Latin America: Overview and Assessment," IZA Discussion Papers 5577, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  13. Daniel S. Hamermesh & Daniel T. Slesnick, 1995. "Unemployment Insurance and Household Welfare: Microeconomic Evidence 1980-93," NBER Working Papers 5315, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Milan Vodopivec, 2004. "Income Support for the Unemployed : Issues and Options," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 14922.
  15. Kugler, Adriana D., 2005. "Wage-shifting effects of severance payments savings accounts in Colombia," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2-3), pages 487-500, February.
  16. Dale T. Mortensen, 1977. "Unemployment insurance and job search decisions," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 30(4), pages 505-517, July.
  17. Joseph Stiglitz & Jungyoll Yun, 2002. "Integration of unemployment insurance with retirement insurance," Discussion Papers 0203-04, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  18. Arellano, Manuel & Bentolila, Samuel & Bover, Olympia, 1998. "Unemployment Duration, Benefit Duration and the Business Cycle," CEPR Discussion Papers 1840, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  19. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-301941 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Jaap H. Abbring & Gerard J. Berg & Jan C. Ours, 2005. "The Effect of Unemployment Insurance Sanctions on the Transition Rate from Unemployment to Employment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(505), pages 602-630, 07.
  21. Martin Feldstein & Daniel Altman, 2007. "Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 21, pages 35-64 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Folster, Stefan, 1999. "Social Insurance Based on Personal Savings," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 75(228), pages 5-18, March.
  23. Orszag, Mike & Snower, Dennis J., 2002. "From Unemployment Benefits to Unemployment Accounts," IZA Discussion Papers 532, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  24. A. Bovenberg & Martin Hansen & Peter Sørensen, 2008. "Individual savings accounts for social insurance: rationale and alternative designs," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 67-86, February.
  25. Bovenberg, A.L. & Hansen, M. & Sorensen, P.B., 2008. "Individual savings accounts for social insurance : Rationale and alternative designs," Other publications TiSEM 72e236b0-ad63-4bea-a314-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
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