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The decision-making procedures for the European Union's finances in the Constitutional debate


  • Luisa Giuriato


The paper accounts for the veto player system that dominates the decisions on the medium-term expenditure ceilings (the Financial Perspectives) and on the revenues (the Own Resources Decision) and for the joint decision-making mode that has been gradually introduced for the European Union’s annual budgetary process. This two-tier system has been confirmed by the new Constitutional Treaty, which does not substantially innovate the intergovernmental procedures governing the medium term programming and financing. With respect to the annual budgetary process, the Constitutional Treaty institutionalises the rules which have been necessitated by practical constraints outside the Treaty machinery: the new process is modelled on a modified version of legislative Codecision and provides for incentives to the parties to agree on the budget draft decided by the Conciliation Committee.

Suggested Citation

  • Luisa Giuriato, 2006. "The decision-making procedures for the European Union's finances in the Constitutional debate," Working Papers 96, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Public Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:sap:wpaper:wp96

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Pierre Salmon, 2003. "The Assignment of Powers in an Open-ended European Union," CESifo Working Paper Series 993, CESifo Group Munich.
    2. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2006. "The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 129-154, August.
    3. Garrett, Geoffrey & Tsebelis, George, 1996. "An institutional critique of intergovernmentalism," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(02), pages 269-299, March.
    4. Henrik Enderlein & Johannes Lindner & Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez & Raymond Ritter, 2005. "The EU budget – how much scope for institutional reform?," Public Economics 0509005, EconWPA.
    5. Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi, 2003. "The Disunity of Unanimity," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 83-94, June.
    6. Hix, Simon, 2002. "Constitutional Agenda-Setting Through Discretion in Rule Interpretation: Why the European Parliament Won at Amsterdam," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(02), pages 259-280, April.
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