Nash rationalizability of collective choice over lotteries
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References listed on IDEAS
- Ray, Indrajit & Zhou, Lin, 2001. "Game Theory via Revealed Preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 415-424, November.
- Conlisk, John, 1989. "Three Variants on the Allais Example," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 392-407, June.
- Amartya K. Sen, 1971. "Choice Functions and Revealed Preference," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(3), pages 307-317.
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Keywordsindependence condition; binary extensions; rationalizability; Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-06-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-DCM-2005-06-19 (Discrete Choice Models)
- NEP-EXP-2005-06-19 (Experimental Economics)
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