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Assurance-maladie : comment adapter les taux de remboursement aux dépenses individuelles de santé ?

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  • Maurice Marchand
  • Barbara Lipszyc

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  • Maurice Marchand & Barbara Lipszyc, 1999. "Assurance-maladie : comment adapter les taux de remboursement aux dépenses individuelles de santé ?," CREPP Working Papers 9901, Centre de Recherche en Economie Publique et de la Population (CREPP) (Research Center on Public and Population Economics) HEC-Management School, University of Liège.
    • Handle: RePEc:rpp:wpaper:9901
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    File URL: http://www2.ulg.ac.be/crepp/papers/crepp-wp199901.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Manning, Willard G, et al, 1987. "Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 251-277, June.
    2. Helmuth Cremer & Pierre Pestieau, 1996. "Redistributive taxation and social insurance," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 3(3), pages 281-295, July.
    3. Besley, Timothy J., 1988. "Optimal reimbursement health insurance and the theory of Ramsey taxation," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 321-336, December.
    4. Eytan Sheshinski, 1972. "The Optimal Linear Income-tax," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 39(3), pages 297-302.
    5. Zeckhauser, Richard, 1970. "Medical insurance: A case study of the tradeoff between risk spreading and appropriate incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 10-26, March.
    6. Mark V. Pauly, 1974. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 88(1), pages 44-62.
    7. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo & Mayshar, Joram & Lundholm, Michael, 1994. "The optimal two-bracket linear income tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 269-290, February.
    8. Sheshinski, Eytan, 1989. "Note on the shape of the optimum income tax schedule," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 201-215, November.
    9. Blomqvist, Ake & Horn, Henrik, 1984. "Public health insurance and optimal income taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 353-371, August.
    10. Maurice Marchand & Pierre Pestieau, 1996. "L'Etat ou le marché dans l'assurance-maladie," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 11(1), pages 3-19.
    11. Steven Shavell, 1979. "On Moral Hazard and Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 93(4), pages 541-562.
    12. Jean-Charles Rochet, 1991. "Incentives, Redistribution and Social Insurance," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 16(2), pages 143-165, December.
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