Self-Fullfilling Expectations, Speculative Attacks And Capital Controls
This paper examines the endogenous implementation of capital controls in the context of a fixed exchange rate regime. It is shown that if there exists a nonzero probability that the policymaker's response to a significant decrease in official foreign reserves will be the introduction of controls, a speculative attack may occur even when current and expected monetary policy is consistent with a permanently viable, control-free, fixed exchange rate regime. Consequently, capital controls may be the outcome of self-fulfilling expectations rather than the result of imprudent economic policies. Copyright 1993 by Ohio State University Press.
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|Date of creation:||1988|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: University of Rochester, Center for Economic Research, Department of Economics, Harkness 231 Rochester, New York 14627 U.S.A.|
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