IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Voting behavior and the economy: evidence from Greece

Listed author(s):
  • Eleftherios Goulas

    ()

    (Department of Law & Finance, Bedfordshire University, UK)

  • Christos Kallandranis

    ()

    (Department of Accounting, Finance & Economics, Regent's University London, UK)

  • Athina Zervoyianni

    ()

    (Department of Economics, University of Patras, Greece; The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis)

This paper examines the relationship between Greek voters' behaviour and the economy, paying particular attention to the effect on two non-orthodox parties, Syriza and Golden Dawn. We use data based on actual vote-shares across 13 Greek peripheries from five general elections over the period 2000-2012. Our results are in accordance with the predictions of the punishment-sanctioning model, namely that incumbent parties are supported by voters in good times whereas voters deprecate them during bad times. In particular, we document that worsening economic conditions have led the Greek electorate to reduce support for traditional parties and move to non-traditional populist parties, like the left-wing Syriza and the ultra-nationalistic right-wing Golden Dawn. Yet we find an asymmetry between these two non-orthodox parties: while electorate support for Syriza is found to be strongly influenced by changes in GDP-growth and unemployment, this is not the case for Golden Dawn. Indeed, our estimates suggest that the increased electoral support for Golden Dawn has been mainly related to the forced fiscal-deficit cuts associated with Greece's bail-out program. This suggests that the Greek electorate does not believe that Golden Dawn can effectively address the country's major economic problems.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.rcea.org/RePEc/pdf/wp17-18.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis in its series Working Paper Series with number 17-18.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: Jul 2017
Handle: RePEc:rim:rimwps:17-18
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Via Patara, 3, 47921 Rimini (RN)

Phone: +390541434142
Fax: +39054155431
Web page: http://rcea.org
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Arellano, Manuel & Bover, Olympia, 1995. "Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 29-51, July.
  2. Fair, Ray C, 1978. "The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 60(2), pages 159-173, May.
  3. Swank, O H, 1993. "Popularity Functions Based on the Partisan Theory," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 75(4), pages 339-356, April.
  4. Blundell, Richard & Bond, Stephen, 1998. "Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 115-143, August.
  5. Nannestad, Peter & Paldam, Martin, 1994. "The VP-Function: A Survey of the Literature on Vote and Popularity Functions after 25 Years," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(3-4), pages 213-245, June.
  6. Georgios Karyotis & Wolfgang Rüdig, 2015. "Blame and Punishment? The Electoral Politics of Extreme Austerity in Greece," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 63(1), pages 2-24, 03.
  7. Georgios Karyotis & Wolfgang Rüdig, 2015. "Blame and Punishment? The Electoral Politics of Extreme Austerity in Greece," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 63(1), pages 1-1, 03.
  8. Andreas Schedler, 1998. "The Normative Force of Electoral Promises," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 10(2), pages 191-214, April.
  9. Fox, Gerald & Phillips, Earl N., 2003. "Interrelationship between presidential approval, presidential votes and macroeconomic performance, 1948-2000," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 411-424, September.
  10. Swank, Otto H., 1998. "Partisan Policies, Macroeconomic Performance and Political Support," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 367-386, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rim:rimwps:17-18. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marco Savioli)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.