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An Experimental Study of Adaptive Behavior in an Oligopolistic Market Game

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Abstract

We consider an oligopolistic market game, in which the players are competing firm in the same market of a homogeneous consumption good. The consumer side is represented by a fixed demand function. The firms decide how much to produce of a perishable consumption good, and they decide upon a number of information signals to be sent into the population in order to attract customers. Due to the minimal information provided, the players do not have a well--specified model of their environment. Our main objective is to characterize the adaptive behavior of the players in such a situation.
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Suggested Citation

  • R. Nagel & N.J. Vriend, 1998. "An Experimental Study of Adaptive Behavior in an Oligopolistic Market Game," Working Papers 388, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    • Handle: RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:388
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Atanasios Mitropoulos, 2001. "Learning Under Little Information: An Experiment on Mutual Fate Control," Game Theory and Information 0110003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Altavilla, Carlo & Luini, Luigi & Sbriglia, Patrizia, 2006. "Social learning in market games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(4), pages 632-652, December.
    4. Nikolaos Georgantzis & Aurora García Gallego, 2001. "Adaptive Behavior By Single-Product And Multiproduct Price Setting Firms In Experimental Markets," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-13, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    5. Bayer, Péter & Kozics, György & Szőke, Nóra Gabriella, 2023. "Best-response dynamics in directed network games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
    6. Apesteguia, Jose, 2006. "Does information matter in the commons?: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 55-69, May.
    7. Alessandra Chirco & Caterina Colombo & Marcella Scrimitore, 2013. "Quantity competition, endogenous motives and behavioral heterogeneity," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(1), pages 55-74, January.
    8. Bayer, Péter & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters, Ronald & Thuijsman, Frank, 2019. "Adaptive learning in weighted network games," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 250-264.
    9. Andreas Nicklisch, 2008. "Semi-collusive advertising and pricing in experimental duopolies," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics 2008_25, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics.
    10. Mitropoulos, Atanasios, 2001. "Learning under minimal information: An experiment on mutual fate control," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 523-557, August.
    11. Dixon, Huw D. & Sbriglia, Patrizia & Somma, Ernesto, 2006. "Learning to collude: An experiment in convergence and equilibrium selection in oligopoly," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 155-167, September.
    12. Andreas Nicklisch, 2006. "Perceiving strategic environments: An experimental study of learning under minimal information," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics 2006_17, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics.
    13. Aviad Tur-Sinai, 2014. "Adaptation patterns and consumer behavior as a dependency on terror," Mind & Society: Cognitive Studies in Economics and Social Sciences, Springer;Fondazione Rosselli, vol. 13(2), pages 257-269, November.
    14. Andreas Nicklisch, 2012. "Does collusive advertising facilitate collusive pricing? Evidence from experimental duopolies," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 515-532, December.
    15. Mauersberger, Felix & Nagel, Rosemarie, 2025. "Modeling noisy learning in a dynamic oligopoly experiment," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).
    16. Levine, Sheen S. & Reypens, Charlotte, 2016. "Small Differences in Experience Bring Large Differences in Performance," MPRA Paper 82858, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Wilfred Amaldoss & Teck-Hua Ho & Aradhna Krishna & Kay-Yut Chen & Preyas Desai & Ganesh Iyer & Sanjay Jain & Noah Lim & John Morgan & Ryan Oprea & Joydeep Srivasatava, 2008. "Experiments on strategic choices and markets," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 417-429, December.
    18. Khan, Nokhaiz Tariq & Hanbali, Ahmad Al & Demir, Emrah & Kim, Yunbae, 2025. "Beyond lotka-volterra: A game-theoretic exploration of two-dimensional airline competition," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    19. P'eter Bayer & Gyorgy Kozics & N'ora Gabriella SzH{o}ke, 2021. "Best-response dynamics in directed network games," Papers 2101.03863, arXiv.org.
    20. Brit Grosskopf, 2003. "Reinforcement and Directional Learning in the Ultimatum Game with Responder Competition," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(2), pages 141-158, October.
    21. Atanasios Mitropoulos, 2001. "Little Information, Efficiency, and Learning - An Experimental Study," Game Theory and Information 0110002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    22. Mauersberger, Felix, 2019. "Thompson Sampling: Endogenously Random Behavior in Games and Markets," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203600, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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