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Riding Free On The Signals Of Others

Author

Listed:
  • Kim Alexander-Cook
  • Dan Bernhardt

    (University of Illinois)

  • Joanne Roberts

Abstract

This paper looks at the incentives to free-ride on the information signaling of others and shows how this can lead to delay in productive activity and to a cascade of activity once information is signaled. In the presence of increasing returns to scale to a profitable project, an initial pioneer may have to incur short-term losses to signal the opportunity to others. Agents may prefer to defer entry in the hope that others will incur those losses and thereby convey the information. Free-riding incentives can be so strong that profitable projects may not be undertaken. Free-riding is worsened when potential entrants must first acquire a costless signal about the project, and this information acquisition is observed: not acquiring the information commits and agent not to incur the entry costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Kim Alexander-Cook & Dan Bernhardt & Joanne Roberts, 1995. "Riding Free On The Signals Of Others," Working Paper 927, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    • Handle: RePEc:qed:wpaper:927
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    File URL: https://www.econ.queensu.ca/sites/econ.queensu.ca/files/qed_wp_927.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Jörn Hendrich Block & Thorsten Staak & Philipp Tilleßen, 2007. "Ist das staatliche Eingreifen ins Gründungsgeschehen theoretisch legitimiert?," FEMM Working Papers 07007, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
    3. Comino, Stefano, 2006. "Entry and exit with information externalities," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 85-99, May.
    4. Marc Santugini, 2020. "On the consumer problem under an informational externality," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(1), pages 149-161, April.
    5. Robin Boadway & Jean-François Tremblay, 2003. "Public Economics and Startup Entrepreneurs," CESifo Working Paper Series 877, CESifo.
    6. Pierdzioch Christian & Stadtmann Georg, 2010. "Herdenverhalten von Wechselkursprognostikern? / Herd Behavior of Exchange Rate Forecasters?," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 230(4), pages 436-453, August.
    7. Hikmet Gunay, 2008. "Strategic delay in market entry," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 41(3), pages 998-1014, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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