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Deeper Integration and Voting on the Common European External Tariff

  • Tavares, Samia
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    Since the 1987 Single European Act, the European Union has deepened its integration process. In the case of the determination of the common external tariff, deeper integration implies that the tariff reflected union-wide preferences. If integration is still shallow, though, the observed tariff will reflect the preferences of a pivotal national government. How governments voted, however, was not public information. This paper uses a unique dataset to test the deep vs. shallow integration hypothesis in an effort to shed light on how decisions are made in the EU. Results support the deep integration hypothesis.

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    File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/960/1/MPRA_paper_960.pdf
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    Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 960.

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    Date of creation: 29 Jul 2006
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    Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:960
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    1. Ronald Findlay & Stanislaw Wellisz, 1982. "Endogenous Tariffs, the Political Economy of Trade Restrictions, and Welfare," NBER Chapters, in: Import Competition and Response, pages 223-244 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Olarreaga, Marcelo & Soloaga, Isidro & Winters, Alan, 1999. "What's behind MERCOSUR's common external tariff?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2231, The World Bank.
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    4. Trefler, Daniel, 1993. "Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An Econometric Study of U.S. Import Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(1), pages 138-60, February.
    5. Jong-Wha Lee & Phillip Swagel, 1994. "Trade Barriers and Trade Flows across Countries and Industries," NBER Working Papers 4799, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Hillman, Arye L & Ursprung, Heinrich W, 1988. "Domestic Politics, Foreign Interests, and International Trade Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 719-45, September.
    7. Samia Costa Tavares, 2007. "The Common External Tariff In A Customs Union: Voting, Logrolling, And National Government Interests," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 345-368, November.
    8. Davidson, Russell & MacKinnon, James G, 1981. "Several Tests for Model Specification in the Presence of Alternative Hypotheses," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(3), pages 781-93, May.
    9. Hillman, Arye L, 1982. "Declining Industries and Political-Support Protectionist Motives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1180-87, December.
    10. L. Wade, 1988. "Review," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 99-100, July.
    11. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1984. "Endogenous Tariff Formation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(5), pages 970-85, December.
    12. Marvel, Howard P & Ray, Edward J, 1983. "The Kennedy Round: Evidence on the Regulation of International Trade in the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(1), pages 190-97, March.
    13. Pecorino, Paul, 1998. "Is There a Free-Rider Problem in Lobbying? Endogenous Tariffs, Trigger Strategies, and the Number of Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 652-60, June.
    14. Rodrik, Dani, 1995. "Political economy of trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1494 Elsevier.
    15. Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1982. "Median Voters or Budget Maximizers: Evidence from School Expenditure Referenda," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 20(4), pages 556-78, October.
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