Three-sided matchings and separable preferences
In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for the existence stable matchings for three-sided systems.
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- Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992.
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541
- Roth,Alvin E. & Sotomayor,Marilda A. Oliveira, 1992. "Two-Sided Matching," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521437882, December.
- Danilov, V. I., 2003. "Existence of stable matchings in some three-sided systems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 145-148, October. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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