La Posición De Los Distintos Partidos Políticos Respecto A La Nueva Ley General De Estabilidad Presupuestaria: Su Influjo En Los Niveles Subcentrales De Gobierno
[The Position Of Different Political Parties With Respect To The New General Law Of Budgetary Discipline: Their Influence In The Subcentral Levels Of Government]
The present work analyzes the different positions of the different political parties in Spain with respect to the new General Law of Budgetary Discipline. In this sense, the paper extracts the relevant information about this law from the different parliamentary debates. First, we elaborate a previous theoretical matrix containing the potential arguments to be used by politicians in their debates, in order to show their opinions supporting the law or going against it. Among the main conclusions, we observe that the central level of government supports the law using mainly legislative and public choice arguments, in the context of its support for the autonomy of the low levels of government. By the contrary, the rest of the political parties, mainly the Catalans Nationalist Parties, consider that the new law is clearly against the autonomy of the low levels of government.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2003|
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- Wallace E. Oates, 1999. "An Essay on Fiscal Federalism," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(3), pages 1120-1149, September.
- Tamim Bayoumi & Barry Eichengreen, 1995. "Restraining Yourself: The Implications of Fiscal Rules for Economic Stabilization," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 42(1), pages 32-48, March.
- Barry Eichengreen & Jurgen von Hagen, 1996. "Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Is There a Tradeoff between Federalism and Budgetary Restrictions?," NBER Working Papers 5517, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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