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Incorporating fairness motives into the Impulse Balance Equilibrium concept: an application to experimental 2X2 games

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  • Tavoni, Alessandro

Abstract

Substantial evidence has been accumulated in recent empirical works on the limited ability of the Nash equilibrium to rationalize observed behavior in many classes of games played by experimental subjects. This realization has led to several attempts aimed at finding tractable equilibrium concepts which perform better empirically, often by introducing a reference point to which players compare the available payoff allocations, as in impulse balance equilibrium (Selten & Chmura, forthcoming) and in the inequity aversion model (Fehr & Schmidt,1999). The purpose of this paper is to review some features of this recent literature and to propose a new, empirically sound, unifying concept which combines elements of fairness with reference considerations.

Suggested Citation

  • Tavoni, Alessandro, 2007. "Incorporating fairness motives into the Impulse Balance Equilibrium concept: an application to experimental 2X2 games," MPRA Paper 7760, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:7760
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9396/1/MPRA_paper_9396.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    2. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-881, September.
    3. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July.
    4. Selten, Reinhard, 1991. "Properties of a measure of predictive success," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 153-167, April.
    5. Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-291, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fairness; Inequity aversion; Aspiration level; Impulse balance; Behavioral economics; Experimental economics; Jacknife estimator;

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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