IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/76863.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

American Exceptionalism in Market Income Inequality: An Analysis Based on Microdata from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database

Author

Listed:
  • Gornick, Janet
  • Milanovic, Branko
  • Johnson, Nathaniel

Abstract

The US has exceptionally high inequality of disposable household income. Among working-age households (those with no persons over age 60), that high level of inequality is caused by a high level of market income inequality (i.e., income before taxes and transfers), paired with a moderate level of redistribution. In this paper, we look more deeply at market income inequality, focusing on its main component – labor income – across a group of 24 OECD countries. We disaggregate the working-age population into household types, defined by the number and gender of the household’s earners and the partnership and parenting status of its members. We concentrate on comparing US results with those of the other OECD countries. Our main finding is that high levels of labor income inequality in the US cut across diverse subgroups. We conclude that within-group inequality of labor incomes in the US is, in almost all groups, high by OECD standards. So it is neither an unusual household composition, nor unusually high mean labor incomes of some groups (nor indirectly, unusually low levels of redistribution), that explain high US disposable income inequality, but instead the fact that high and low labor incomes are universally spread across all household/demographic categories.

Suggested Citation

  • Gornick, Janet & Milanovic, Branko & Johnson, Nathaniel, 2017. "American Exceptionalism in Market Income Inequality: An Analysis Based on Microdata from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database," MPRA Paper 76863, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:76863
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/76863/1/MPRA_paper_76863.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, 2008. "Why has CEO Pay Increased So Much?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(1), pages 49-100.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Cathal O’Donoghue & Jason Loughrey & Denisa M. Sologon, 2018. "Decomposing the Drivers of Changes in Inequality During the Great Recession in Ireland using the Fields Approach," The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 49(2), pages 173-200.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Neus, Werner, 2014. "Eigenkapitalnormen, Boni und Risikoanreize in Banken," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 68(2), pages 92-107.
    2. Petra Štamfestová & Lukáš Sobíšek & Jiří Hnilica, 2023. "Firm Size Distribution in the Central European Context," Central European Business Review, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2023(5), pages 151-175.
    3. Sudip Datta & Mai Iskandar-Datta, 2014. "Upper-echelon executive human capital and compensation: Generalist vs specialist skills," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(12), pages 1853-1866, December.
    4. Luis Garicano & Thomas N. Hubbard, 2016. "The Returns to Knowledge Hierarchies," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(4), pages 653-684.
    5. Fabbri, Francesca & Marin, Dalia, 2012. "What explains the rise in CEO pay in Germany? A Panel Data Analysis for 1977-2009," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 374, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    6. Katsiaryna Bardos & Steven E. Kozlowski & Michael R. Puleo, 2021. "Entrenchment or efficiency? CEO‐to‐employee pay ratio and the cost of debt," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 56(3), pages 511-533, August.
    7. Maida, Agata & Pezone, Vincenzo, 2024. "CEO Pay Disclosure and Within-Firm Wage Inequality," IZA Discussion Papers 17243, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 2009. "Democratic Capital: The Nexus of Political and Economic Change," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 88-126, July.
    9. Thomas Blanchet & Juliette Fournier & Thomas Piketty, 2022. "Generalized Pareto Curves: Theory and Applications," Review of Income and Wealth, International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 68(1), pages 263-288, March.
    10. Guoli Chen & Sterling Huang & Philipp Meyer‐Doyle & Denisa Mindruta, 2021. "Generalist versus specialist CEOs and acquisitions: Two‐sided matching and the impact of CEO characteristics on firm outcomes," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(6), pages 1184-1214, June.
    11. Igor Fedotenkov, 2020. "A Review of More than One Hundred Pareto-Tail Index Estimators," Statistica, Department of Statistics, University of Bologna, vol. 80(3), pages 245-299.
    12. Harmenberg, Karl, 2024. "A simple theory of Pareto-distributed earnings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 234(C).
    13. Chen, Zhimin & Ibragimov, Rustam, 2019. "One country, two systems? The heavy-tailedness of Chinese A- and H- share markets," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 115-141.
    14. King, Timothy & Srivastav, Abhishek & Williams, Jonathan, 2016. "What's in an education? Implications of CEO education for bank performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 287-308.
    15. Oyer, Paul & Schaefer, Scott, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 20, pages 1769-1823, Elsevier.
    16. Changmin Lee, 2007. "The Unbalanced Matching in a Director Market," CAEPR Working Papers 2007-012, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    17. Emilie R. Feldman, 2016. "Managerial compensation and corporate spinoffs," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(10), pages 2011-2030, October.
    18. di Giovanni, Julian & Levchenko, Andrei A. & Rancière, Romain, 2011. "Power laws in firm size and openness to trade: Measurement and implications," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 42-52, September.
    19. Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jörgen, 2020. "Delegation of investment decisions, and optimal remuneration of agents," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    20. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2016. "Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 124(2), pages 305-370.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Wage distribution; earnings distributions; income inequality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
    • D33 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Factor Income Distribution

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:76863. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.