A behavioral note on the demand for health
On this note we introduce some behavioral hypothesis on the static version of Grossman model on the demand for health. Three behavioral hypotheses are considered in the static version of Grossman model: the status, the social pressure and trust. We show that a preference for status and for social approval result in a higher optimal choice for health. The same cannot be concluded when considering the influence of trust. The variable trust has an ambiguous result on the optimal health decision of individuals.
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- Howarth, Richard B., 1996. "Status effects and environmental externalities," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 25-34, January.
- Grossman, Michael, 1972. "On the Concept of Health Capital and the Demand for Health," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(2), pages 223-55, March-Apr.
- Kandel, E. & Lazear, E.P., 1990.
"Peer Pressure and Partnerships,"
90-07, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
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