Pricing behavior of firms when consumers have an Imperfect Recall
Operating in markets which include the characteristics of both the perfect and imperfect competitions has never been so easy for a firm, while setting an acceptable price. Various firms show various pricing behavior to generate and maximize revenues. This paper is an attempt to encompass pricing behaviors of firms when consumers have imperfect recall for the past prices of the products, while giving a thought to ponder that which of the behaviors has an optimal rationale when a firm sets market price for a commodity. The findings concludes that firms set prices as similar as monopolist when the consumers of their products have imperfect recall for price they offered already in yore.
|Date of creation:||2012|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, 2006.
"Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 121(2), pages 505-540.
- Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, 2005. "Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets," NBER Working Papers 11755, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Laibson, David I. & Gabaix, Xavier, 2006. "Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets," Scholarly Articles 4554333, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- James Dow, 1991. "Search Decisions with Limited Memory," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(1), pages 1-14.
- Michael R. Baye & John Morgan, 2004.
"Price Dispersion in the Lab and on the Internet: Theory and Evidence,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(3), pages 448-466, Autumn.
- Michael R. Baye & John Morgan, 2004. "Price Dispersion in the Lab and on the Internet: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 2004-02, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
- Ran Spiegler, 2005.
"Competition over Agents with Boundedly Rational Expectations,"
122247000000000535, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Spiegler, Ran, 2006. "Competition over agents with boundedly rational expectations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(2), pages 207-231, June.
- Diamond, Peter A., 1971. "A model of price adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 156-168, June.
- Varian, Hal R, 1980. "A Model of Sales," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 651-659, September.
- Hehenkamp, Burkhard, 2002. "Sluggish Consumers: An Evolutionary Solution to the Bertrand Paradox," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 44-76, July.
- David Laibson & Xavier Gabaix, 2004. "Competition and Consumer Confusion," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 663, Econometric Society.
- Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson & Hongyi Li, 2005. "Extreme Value Theory and the Effects of Competition on Profits," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000656, UCLA Department of Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:35682. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.