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Strategic Thresholds and its Implications


  • Mishra, Sandhya


This paper aims at defining a Strategic Threshold or Flash points for each strategy followed by the society as a whole. The paper attempts at analyzing interactions between two groups and the effect of change in trust on the path traversed. The paper draws analogy to the behavior of atoms/molecules during a chemical reaction to the influence of Information (positive or negative) on the trust level and the resulting shift in the general social strategy. A society can be considered as a collection of molecules (people) at various energy states (trust level) normally distributed. This implies the presence of a minority of population of high energy state (catalysts in case of chemical reaction OR leaders/influential people in case of societies) . The whole path traversed by the moderate population is influenced by the energy (in the form of propaganda) of these high energy particles until a majority of the population cross the activation energies towards higher macro state (lower trust/social capital). The theory may be used to analyze a variety of social interactions like the ethnic conflicts in Africa and some South Asian nations. The paper also lays out the role of leaders to soothe the conflict and bring back the society to a lower energy state (Higher trust/social capital).

Suggested Citation

  • Mishra, Sandhya, 2011. "Strategic Thresholds and its Implications," MPRA Paper 29383, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:29383

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Wydick,Bruce, 2008. "Games in Economic Development," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521867580, March.
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    More about this item


    Detrimental Factor of defection; Trust Breaking Threshold Factor; Equilibrium Strategy; Game Theory;

    JEL classification:

    • A20 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics - - - General
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • A10 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - General

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