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A tale of three countries, dispersed ownership and greater risk taking levels by management: risk monitoring tools in bank regulation and supervision – developments since the collapse of Barings Plc (re – visited)

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  • Ojo, Marianne

Abstract

This paper is aimed at explaining why higher concentrations of the ownership of large firms do not necessarily and automatically facilitate lower risk taking levels – where there is scope for the abuse of powers. As well as illustrating why effective corporate governance systems are essential in facilitating high levels of monitoring, accountability and disclosure, the paper also highlights why a consideration of the costs of ownership concentration and its benefits, is required in determining whether corporate governance systems will be effective or not.

Suggested Citation

  • Ojo, Marianne, 2011. "A tale of three countries, dispersed ownership and greater risk taking levels by management: risk monitoring tools in bank regulation and supervision – developments since the collapse of Barings Plc (," MPRA Paper 28131, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:28131
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28131/1/MPRA_paper_28131.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jeremy Edwards & Marcus Nibler, 2000. "Corporate governance in Germany: the role of banks and ownership concentration," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 15(31), pages 237-267, October.
    2. Gorton, Gary & Schmid, Frank A., 2000. "Universal banking and the performance of German firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 29-80.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    corporate governance; ownership structures; banks; risk; regulation; monitoring; disclosure; accountability; liquidity; internal controls;

    JEL classification:

    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises

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