Common and private property to exhaustible resources: theoretical implications for economic growth
We develop two models of economic growth with exhaustible natural resources and consumers heterogeneous in time preferences. The first model assumes private ownership of natural resources. In the second model, natural resources are commonly owned and the resource extraction rate is chosen by voting. We show that if discount factors are given exogenously, the long-run rate of growth under private property is higher than or equal to that under common property. If the discount factors are formed endogenously, under some circumstances common property can result in a higher rate of growth than private property.
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