Co-operative and competitive enforced self regulation: the role of governments, private actors and banks in corporate responsibility
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- Marianne Ojo, 2011. "Co-operative and competitive enforced self regulation: The role of governments, private actors and banks in corporate responsibility," Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 19(2), pages 139-155, May.
References listed on IDEAS
- Jeremy Edwards & Marcus Nibler, 2000. "Corporate governance in Germany: the role of banks and ownership concentration," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 15(31), pages 237-267, October.
- Roberta Romano, 2005. "Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate Governance?," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 212-231, Summer.
- Genschel, Philipp & Plümper, Thomas, 1997. "Regulatory competition and international cooperation," MPIfG Working Paper 97/4, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
- Miles, David, 1995. "Optimal regulation of deposit taking financial intermediaries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 1365-1384, August.
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"Universal banking and the performance of German firms,"
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- Gary Gorton & Frank A. Schmid, 1996. "Universal Banking and the Performance of German Firms," NBER Working Papers 5453, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Ojo, Marianne, 2010. "The impact of capital and disclosure requirements on risks and risk taking incentives," MPRA Paper 20404, University Library of Munich, Germany.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Senderski, Marcin, 2012. "Self-regulation as a remedy for market turmoil: An over-the-counter or a prescription drug?," MPRA Paper 51328, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ojo, Marianne, 2011. "Addressing the inadequacies of private law in the regulation of contracts – during and post contract formation periods," MPRA Paper 32282, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
Keywordsaccountability; asymmetric information; universal banking; regulation; regulatory capture; government;
- K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
- A10 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - General
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-06-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2010-06-04 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-LAW-2010-06-04 (Law & Economics)
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