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Game theory on strategic communication: an approach from Thomas S. Schelling

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  • Estrada, Fernando

Abstract

In their recent work Thomas S. Schelling (2007, 2010), reiterating original arguments about game theory and its applications to social sciences. In particular, game theory helps to explore situations in which agents make decisions interdependent (strategic communication). Schelling's originality is to extend economic theory to social sciences. When a player can anticipate the options and influence the decisions of others. The strategy, indirect communication plays a crucial role. To illustrate, we investigate how to perform the payoff matrix in cases of bribery and threat

Suggested Citation

  • Estrada, Fernando, 2010. "Game theory on strategic communication: an approach from Thomas S. Schelling," MPRA Paper 21772, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:21772
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/21772/1/MPRA_paper_21772.pdf
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50146/1/MPRA_paper_21772.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fernando, Estrada, 2007. "La informaciĆ³n y el rumor en zonas de conflicto
      [The information and rumor in zones of conflict]
      ," MPRA Paper 20344, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social Science; Schelling; game theory; strategic communications; bribes; threats.;

    JEL classification:

    • B0 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - General
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • A1 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • B00 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - General - - - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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