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Comunicación indirecta en situaciones de soborno y amenaza
[Indirect communication in bribery and threatening situations]

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Listed:
  • Estrada, Fernando

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to explain the relevance of the theory of indirect communication strategy and negotiating conflict. Based on Thomas Schelling illustrates indirect communication cases: bribery and threats. It shows that both bribery and threats are rational preference mechanisms, whose functions can be expressed in non-linear diagrams. This analysis also contributes to the theory of strategic games very different from zero. Indirect communication is a fundamental basis for strategic action in various forms of conflict, from war to irregular traffic jams caused by vehicular traffic. Our particular interest in the bribery and the threat is related to common cases in the colombian conflict.

Suggested Citation

  • Estrada, Fernando, 2009. "Comunicación indirecta en situaciones de soborno y amenaza
    [Indirect communication in bribery and threatening situations]
    ," MPRA Paper 20070, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:20070
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20070/1/MPRA_paper_20070.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fernando, Estrada, 2007. "La información y el rumor en zonas de conflicto
      [The information and rumor in zones of conflict]
      ," MPRA Paper 20344, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strategy of Conflict; indirect communication; negotiation; bribery; threats; indirect speech acts.;

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other

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