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Laços entre cooperativas: um estudo sobre a prática e impacto do uso de administradores em comum

Author

Listed:
  • Schneider, Alexandre Marcelo
  • Carbonai, Davide

Abstract

The connections between organizations, through their main decision-making bodies, create links known as Board Interlocking, with effects that extend beyond the operational sphere. Based on Social Network Analysis and interviews, this study investigates these connections and their implications in cooperatives in Southern Brazil. The motivations for the phenomenon were compared with the reasons traditionally presented in the literature, and real cases are transcribed to demonstrate worrying impacts on governance and democratic equity in cooperatives. The results confirmed the existence of interconnections in cooperatives and demonstrated their use as part of a controversial strategy for maintaining political and institutional power.

Suggested Citation

  • Schneider, Alexandre Marcelo & Carbonai, Davide, 2025. "Laços entre cooperativas: um estudo sobre a prática e impacto do uso de administradores em comum," MPRA Paper 128965, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:128965
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/128965/1/MPRA_paper_128965.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hallock, Kevin F., 1997. "Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors and Executive Compensation," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(3), pages 331-344, September.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • M1 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics
    • M48 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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