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Disbalances in inefficient equilibrium states in “vertical” relationships of agents

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  • SOKOLOVSKYI, DMYTRO

Abstract

The problem of identification of efficient economic conditions, arising from the «vertical» agents’ relationship, is considered. It’s shown that the application of classical concepts of market failure to estimate the intracorporate relationships is inexpedient. The application of the principal-agent theory using the concept of disbalances is considered. A number of examples of the interaction between economic agents, the eventual failure of whose can be proved by disbalances given. The pattern of evolutionary transformation of relationship, characterized by coordinating or strategic disbalance, is described for Pareto inefficient conditions and norms.

Suggested Citation

  • Sokolovskyi, Dmytro, 2025. "Disbalances in inefficient equilibrium states in “vertical” relationships of agents," MPRA Paper 123637, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:123637
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Aumann, Robert J., 1995. "Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 6-19.
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    JEL classification:

    • C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General

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