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Reform of a modern welfare-state through a basic income to re-start higher levels of economic growth

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  • Weber, Cameron

Abstract

The purpose of this research is to show that we can replace the United States’ welfare-state with something (a Basic Income) which will be both more equitable and as well will allow an increase in the rate of economic growth.1 Some commentators believe that there is new economic status quo in the welfare-states of the “West2,” where the West is faced with a “new normal” of lower rates of economic growth and higher rates of unemployment because of structural changes in the 21st century not least the Financial Crises of 2007-08 and the resulting Great Recession. In this paper we will propose that the reason for the economic stagnation in the United States is the way the redistributional safety-net has been constructed. We will then quantify this welfare- state and discuss its negative effect on the economy. Following this we will present the proposed Basic Income and explain how replacing the current welfare-state with a Basic Income will improve both the equality of the rule of law, and, will provide incentives for more economizing behavior in society. Incentives which allow increased levels of economic growth.

Suggested Citation

  • Weber, Cameron, 2016. "Reform of a modern welfare-state through a basic income to re-start higher levels of economic growth," MPRA Paper 115004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:115004
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cameron Weber, 2013. "Taming Leviathan with a Basic Income," Exploring the Basic Income Guarantee, in: Guinevere Liberty Nell (ed.), Basic Income and the Free Market, chapter 0, pages 81-96, Palgrave Macmillan.
    2. Beard, Charles A., 1913. "An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, edition 127, number beard1913.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • N42 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-

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