Instilling Norms in a Turmoil of Spillovers
Social norms and conventions have formally been defined as pertaining to static sets of situations. In this paper, we introduce a slight variation of Cristina Bicchieri's definition, where the set of situations is dynamically determined by previous actions. To suggest how the definition may be employed we first introduce a problem that would be hard to formulate within the classical definition: How to fight a destructive norm in a setting with a multitude of institutions. The example assumes that enforcement of conformative behavior in all institutions would be too costly. Further, enforcement of conformative behavior in a single institution would be drowned by defective behavioral spillovers from surrounding situations where the bad behavior is still the norm. The scheme drafted is to take the cost to enforce conformist behavior in a single institution while suspending the rest. The conformist behavior will after a while become the "the right thing to do" behavior in the kept institution.
|Date of creation:||Feb 2015|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 311 Cohen Hall, 249 South 36th Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104|
Web page: http://www.sas.upenn.edu/ppe/index.html
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rossella Argenziano & Itzhak Gilboa, 2012. "History as a coordination device," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 73(4), pages 501-512, October.
- Bednar, Jenna & Chen, Yan & Liu, Tracy Xiao & Page, Scott, 2012. "Behavioral spillovers and cognitive load in multiple games: An experimental study," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 12-31.
- Cason, Timothy N. & Savikhin, Anya C. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2012.
"Behavioral spillovers in coordination games,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 233-245.
- Timothy Cason & Anya Samek & Roman Sheremeta, 2010. "Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games," Artefactual Field Experiments 00423, The Field Experiments Website.
- Timothy N. Cason & Anya C. Savikhin & Roman Sheremeta, 2011. "Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games," Working Papers 11-20, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Cason, Timothy & Savikhin, Anya & Sheremeta, Roman, 2011. "Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games," MPRA Paper 52106, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Raymond Fisman & Edward Miguel, 2007. "Corruption, Norms, and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(6), pages 1020-1048, December. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ppc:wpaper:0004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alessandro Sontuoso)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.