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What Makes a Price Fair? An Experimental Study of Transaction Experience and Endogenous Fairness Views

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  • Holger Herz
  • Dmitry Taubinsky

Abstract

People’s fairness preferences are an important constraint for what constitutes an acceptable economic transaction, yet little is known about how these preferences are formed. In this paper, we provide clean evidence that previous transactions play an important role in shaping perceptions of fairness. Buyers used to high market prices, for example, are more likely to perceive high prices as fair than buyers used to low market prices. Similarly, employees used to high wages are more likely to perceive low wages as unfair. Our data further allows us to decompose this history-dependence into the effects of pure observation versus the experience of payoff-relevant outcomes. We propose two classes of models of path-dependent fairness preferences—either based on endogenous fairness reference points or based on shifts in salience—that can account for our data. Structural estimates of both types of models imply a substantial deviation from existing history-independent models of fairness. Our results have implications for price discrimination, labor markets, and dynamic pricing.

Suggested Citation

  • Holger Herz & Dmitry Taubinsky, 2018. "What Makes a Price Fair? An Experimental Study of Transaction Experience and Endogenous Fairness Views," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 316-352.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:jeurec:v:16:y:2018:i:2:p:316-352.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/jeea/jvx011
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    Cited by:

    1. Marco Fongoni & Daniel Schaefer & Carl Singleton, 2023. "When are wages cut? The roles of incomplete contracts and employee involvement," Working Papers hal-03953201, HAL.
    2. Fongoni, Marco & Dickson, Alex, 2015. "A Theory of Wage Setting Behavior," SIRE Discussion Papers 2015-57, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    3. Brandts, Jordi & Riedl, Arno, 2020. "Market interaction and efficient cooperation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    4. Lenel, Friederike & Steiner, Susan, 2020. "Formal insurance and solidarity. Experimental evidence from Cambodia," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 174(C), pages 212-234.
    5. Edika Quispe-Torreblanca & David Hume & John Gathergood & George Loewenstein & Neil Stewart, 2023. "At the Top of the Mind: Peak Prices and the Disposition Effect," Discussion Papers 2023-09, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    6. Björn Bartling & Tobias Gesche & Nick Netzer, 2017. "Does the absence of human sellers bias bidding behavior in auction experiments?," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 3(1), pages 44-61, July.
    7. Dickson, Alex & Fongoni, Marco, 2019. "Asymmetric reference-dependent reciprocity, downward wage rigidity, and the employment contract," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 409-429.
    8. Herz, Holger & Schmutzler, Armin & Volk, André, 2019. "Cooperation and mistrust in relational contracts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 366-380.
    9. Edwin Ip & Andreas Leibbrandt & Joseph Vecci, 2020. "How Do Gender Quotas Affect Workplace Relationships? Complementary Evidence from a Representative Survey and Labor Market Experiments," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(2), pages 805-822, February.
    10. Kenneth S. Chan & Vivian Lei & Filip Vesely, 2024. "Escape poverty trap with trust? An experimental study," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 62(1), pages 37-66, February.
    11. Marco Fongoni & Daniel Schaefer & Carl Singleton, 2025. "Why Wages Don’t Fall in Jobs with Incomplete Contracts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 71(8), pages 6319-6339, August.
    12. Marco Fongoni, 2018. "A theoretical note on asymmetries in intensity and persistence of reciprocity in labour markets," Working Papers 1815, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.
    13. Choi, Ginny Seung & Storr, Virgil Henry, 2023. "The morality of markets in theory and empirics," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 216(C), pages 590-607.
    14. Konstantinos Ioannidis, 2022. "Habitual Communication," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 22-016/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    15. Marco Fongoni, 2018. "Workers' reciprocity and the (ir)relevance of wage cyclicality for the volatility of job creation," Working Papers 1809, University of Strathclyde Business School, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • D0 - Microeconomics - - General
    • J0 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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