Next Generation Access Networks: The Effects of Vertical Spillovers on Access and Innovation
The model that we develop here considers that an upstream firm sells a vital input to downstream firms. There are vertical spillovers and two different regulatory policies of the input price: cost oriented regulation and no-regulation. We also admit two alternative market structures: vertical integration and vertical separation. With this setting we study the effects of the spillovers on foreclosure and on the investment of the upstream firm with and without access price regulation in the two market structures. We conclude that in this setting foreclosure is not a necessary outcome and that the investment of the upstream firm depends on the values of the spillovers of each firm. The increase of the investment with regulation is more likely with vertical separation but it can also happen with vertical integration although this is not a typical result.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2009|
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"Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers,"
American Economic Review,
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- Blum Ulrich & Growitsch Christian & Krap Niels, 2007. "Broadband Investment and the Threat of Regulation: Preventing Monopoly Exploitation or Infrastructure Construction?," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(3), pages 1-13, September. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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