Measuring market power in the Iberian electricity wholesale market through the residual demand curve
The existence of market power in the electricity market is a recurrent issue. Measuring and understanding market power practices in the Iberian electricity market turn out to be interesting: though a liberalized market, two integrated firms control 80% of total demand and there is a strong - often direct - intervention of government in the market. For various reasons, among which the difficulty in obtaining reliable, extensive data stands out, market power in the Iberian electricity market has rarely been measured. This work aims to contribute to a better knowledge of the way market power occurs. We calculate the elasticity of residual demand to evaluate the two dominant firm’s market power, using hourly bides in the Spanish spot market for the period July-August 2004 to 2006. Although our approach was highlighted by Frank Wolak work on the electricity sector, we extend it and discuss its constraints. We discuss the results obtained in the light of the evolution of the electricity sector during that period.
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- Aitor Ciarreta & María Paz Espinosa, 2003.
"Market Power In The Spanish Wholesale Electricity Market,"
Working Papers. Serie AD
2003-22, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Natalia Fabra & Juan Toro, 2001.
"Price Wars and Collusion in the Spanish Electricity Market,"
Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces
E2001/05, Centro de Estudios Andaluces.
- Fabra, Natalia & Toro, Juan, 2005. "Price wars and collusion in the Spanish electricity market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 155-181, April.
- Juan Toro & Natalia Fabra, 2002. "Price Wars and Collusion in the Spanish Electricity Market," Economics Series Working Papers 136, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Natalia Fabra & Juan Toro, 2002. "Price Wars and Collusion in the Spanish Electricity Market," Industrial Organization 0212001, EconWPA, revised 31 Aug 2003.
- Baker, Jonathan B. & Bresnahan, Timothy F., 1988. "Estimating the residual demand curve facing a single firm," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 283-300.
- Severin Borenstein & James B. Bushnell & Frank A. Wolak, 2002. "Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California's Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1376-1405, December.
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