The Political Economy of Protection
This paper offers a selective, interpretative survey of the literature on the political economy of international trade policy. Unilateral trade policy and multilateral trade agreements are covered, but preferential trading arrangements are not. Much of the literature is characterized either by a discrepancy between what policymakers say they are doing and how the theory models their actions (the Cognitive Dissonance issue) or by a lack of a detailed microeconomic foundation (the Black Box issue).
|Date of creation:||30 Jun 2010|
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Web page: http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/pier
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- Van Long, Ngo & Vousden, Neil, 1991. "Protectionist responses and declining industries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1-2), pages 87-103, February.
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