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The Political Economy of Protection

Author

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  • Wilfred J. Ethier

    () (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania)

Abstract

This paper offers a selective, interpretative survey of the literature on the political economy of international trade policy. Unilateral trade policy and multilateral trade agreements are covered, but preferential trading arrangements are not. Much of the literature is characterized either by a discrepancy between what policymakers say they are doing and how the theory models their actions (the Cognitive Dissonance issue) or by a lack of a detailed microeconomic foundation (the Black Box issue).

Suggested Citation

  • Wilfred J. Ethier, 2010. "The Political Economy of Protection," PIER Working Paper Archive 10-022, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  • Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:10-022
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    File URL: http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/system/files/working-papers/10-022.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Van Long, Ngo & Vousden, Neil, 1991. "Protectionist responses and declining industries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1-2), pages 87-103, February.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political support function; Protection For Sale; trade agreements; exchange of market access;

    JEL classification:

    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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