Dependence and Uniqueness in Bayesian Games
This paper studies uniqueness of equilibrium in symmetric 2 x 2 bayesian games.� It shows that if signals are highly but not perfectly dependent then players play their risk-dominant actions for all but a vanishing set of signal realizations.� In contrast to the global games literature, noise is not assumed to be additive.� Dependence is modeled using the theory of copulas.
|Date of creation:||01 Apr 2012|
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- Nelsen, Roger B. & Quesada-Molina, José Juan & Rodriguez-Lallena, José Antonio & Úbeda-Flores, Manuel, 2008. "On the construction of copulas and quasi-copulas with given diagonal sections," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 473-483, April.
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