IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/osf/lawarx/82un9.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Misaligned Union laws? A comparative analysis of certification in the Cybersecurity Act and the General Data Protection Regulation

Author

Listed:
  • Kamara, Irene

    (Tilburg Law School)

Abstract

In 2019, the Cybersecurity Act, the EU law aiming to achieve high level of cybersecurity in the Union and Member States, entered into force. The CSA belongs to a broader set of Union laws providing a framework of legal protection of individual and collective rights from harmful use of information and communication technologies. Those laws introduce private law instruments for the achievement of legislative goals.1 Despite the overarching similarities of the regulated fields, the Union legislator adopted seemingly different approaches in introducing private law instruments. The Chapter seeks to comparatively present the certification frameworks as introduced in the Cybersecurity Act and the General Protection Regulation, with the aim to provide an understanding on the legislative choices and the normative, implementation and policy reasons underpinning the introduction of private law instruments in Union laws.

Suggested Citation

  • Kamara, Irene, 2020. "Misaligned Union laws? A comparative analysis of certification in the Cybersecurity Act and the General Data Protection Regulation," LawArXiv 82un9, Center for Open Science.
  • Handle: RePEc:osf:lawarx:82un9
    DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/82un9
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://osf.io/download/5fccfe0faa60b802f78937d2/
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.31219/osf.io/82un9?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Konrad Stahl & Roland Strausz, 2017. "Certification and Market Transparency," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 84(4), pages 1842-1868.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Shin-yi Peng, 2022. "Public–Private Interactions in Privacy Governance," Laws, MDPI, vol. 11(6), pages 1-13, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mehmet Ekmekci & Nenad Kos, 2020. "Signaling Covertly Acquired Information," Working Papers 658, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    2. Ingrid Bauer & Liudmila Zavolokina & Gerhard Schwabe, 2020. "Is there a market for trusted car data?," Electronic Markets, Springer;IIM University of St. Gallen, vol. 30(2), pages 211-225, June.
    3. Ekmekci, Mehmet & Kos, Nenad, 2023. "Signaling covertly acquired information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
    4. Helmut Bester & Matthias Lang & Jianpei Li, 2021. "Signaling versus Auditing," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(4), pages 859-883, December.
    5. Hoppe-Wewetzer, Heidrun C. & Siemering, Christian, 2020. "Advertisement-Financed Credit Ratings," CEPR Discussion Papers 14735, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Yamashita, Takuro, 2018. "Optimal Public Information Disclosure by Mechanism Designer," TSE Working Papers 18-936, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    7. S. Nageeb Ali & Gregory Lewis & Shoshana Vasserman, 2019. "Voluntary Disclosure and Personalized Pricing," NBER Working Papers 26592, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Christophe Cahn & Mattia Girotti & Federica Salvadè, 2018. "External Credit Ratings and Bank Lending," Working papers 691, Banque de France.
    9. Rodivilov, Alexander, 2022. "Monitoring innovation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 297-326.
    10. Matthieu Bouvard & Raphaël Levy, 2018. "Two-Sided Reputation in Certification Markets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(10), pages 4755-4774, October.
    11. Andreas Engelmann & Ingrid Bauer & Mateusz Dolata & Michael Nadig & Gerhard Schwabe, 2022. "Promoting Less Complex and More Honest Price Negotiations in the Online Used Car Market with Authenticated Data," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 419-451, April.
    12. Bizzotto, Jacopo & Harstad, Bård, 2023. "The certifier for the long run," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    13. De Chiara, Alessandro & Manna, Ester, 2022. "Corruption, regulation, and investment incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 142(C).
    14. Breuer, Matthias & Le, Anthony & Vetter, Felix, 2023. "Audit mandates, audit firms, and auditors," Working Papers 333, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    15. Tan, Teck Yong, 2023. "Optimal transparency of monitoring capability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 209(C).
    16. Bester, Helmut & Lang, Matthias & Li, Jianpei, 2018. "Signaling versus costly information acquisition," Discussion Papers 2018/11, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    17. Abate, Gashaw T. & Bernard, Tanguy & de Janvry, Alain & Sadoulet, Elisabeth & Trachtman, Carly, 2021. "Introducing quality certification in staple food markets in Sub-Saharan Africa: Four conditions for successful implementation," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 105(C).
    18. Terovitis, Spyros, 2022. "Information disclosure and the feedback effect in capital markets," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 49(C).
    19. Bizzotto, Jacopo & Rüdiger, Jesper & Vigier, Adrien, 2020. "Testing, disclosure and approval," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    20. Ennio Bilancini & Leonardo Boncinelli, 2021. "When market unraveling fails and mandatory disclosure backfires: Persuasion games with labeling and costly information acquisition," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 585-599, August.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:osf:lawarx:82un9. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: OSF (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://osf.io/preprints/lawarxiv/discover .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.