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The Impact of CCP Liquidity and Capital Demands on Clearing Members Under Stress

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  • John Heilbron
  • Stathis Tompaidis

Abstract

During market stress, various demands on U.S. G-SIBs by central counterparties may further deplete the banks’ already stressed liquid and capital resources. (Working Paper no. 25-03).

Suggested Citation

  • John Heilbron & Stathis Tompaidis, 2025. "The Impact of CCP Liquidity and Capital Demands on Clearing Members Under Stress," Working Papers 25-03, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
    • Handle: RePEc:ofr:wpaper:25-03
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Iñaki Aldasoro & Fernando Avalos & Wenqian Huang, 2023. "Liquid assets at CCPs and systemic liquidity risks," BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for International Settlements, December.
    2. Wenqian Huang & Elöd Takáts, 2024. "Model Risk at Central Counterparties: Is Skin in the Game a Game Changer?," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 20(3), pages 161-184, July.
    3. David Murphy & Michalis Vasios & Nick Vause, 2014. "Financial Stability Paper No 29: An investigation into the procyclicality of risk-based initial margin models," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 29, Bank of England.
    4. Che Sidanius & Filip Zikes, 2012. "Financial Stability Paper No 18: OTC derivatives reform and collateral demand impact," Bank of England Financial Stability Papers 18, Bank of England.
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    Cited by:

    1. John Heilbron & Nick Schwartz, 2026. "Central Counterparty Management of Liquid and Prefunded Resources," Working Papers 26-04, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.

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