Endogenous Acquisition of Information on Consumer Willingness to Pay in a Product Differentiated Duopoly
We investigate how the endogenous acquisition of information, of a certain quality level, on consumers' willingness to pay (location) affects the equilibrium prices and welfare in a spatial price discrimination model. Higher information quality implies that the firms who acquire the information can identify the location of each consumer more accurately. By varying the information quality we are able to obtain the equilibrium in the game for all levels of price discrimination and in the limit the case of perfect price discrimination. This gives us insights about equilibrium behavior in markets (especially on-line markets) where: 1) Information on consumer characteristics is used by the firms to facilitate price discrimination and 2) The quality of information is constantly improving due to advances of the information technology (IT). We show that information is beneficial for the consumer welfare, which is maximized at ``moderate'' levels of information quality. Firms' profits exhibit a U-shape pattern as a function of the information quality.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|Date of creation:||2001|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Stony Brook, NY 11794-4384|
Web page: http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/economics/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Schmalensee, Richard., 1980.
"Output and welfare implications of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination,"
1095-80., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
- Schmalensee, Richard, 1981. "Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree Price Discrimination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(1), pages 242-47, March.
- Kenneth S. Corts, 1998. "Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly: All-Out Competition and Strategic Commitment," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(2), pages 306-323, Summer.
- Beth Allen, 1986. "The Demand for (Differentiated) Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(3), pages 311-323.
- Varian, Hal R, 1985. "Price Discrimination and Social Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 870-75, September.
- Hwang, Hae-shin, 1995. "Information Acquisition and Relative Efficiency of Competitive, Oligopoly and Monopoly Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 325-40, May.
- Greg Shaffer & Z. John Zhang, 1995. "Competitive Coupon Targeting," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 14(4), pages 395-416.
- Vives, Xavier, 1984. "Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 71-94, October.
- Bester, Helmut & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 1996.
"Coupons and oligopolistic price discrimination,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 227-242.
- Hwang Hae-shin, 1993. "Optimal Information Acquisition for Heterogenous Duopoly Firms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 385-402, April.
- Thomas R. Palfrey, 1982. "Risk Advantages and Information Acquisition," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 219-224, Spring.
- Holmes, Thomas J, 1989. "The Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 244-50, March.
- Caglayan, Mustafa & Usman, Murat, 2000. "Costly signal extraction and profit differentials in oligopolistic markets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 359-363, December.
- Creane, Anthony, 1996. "An informational externality in a competitive market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 331-344, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nys:sunysb:01-03. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.