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Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games: Spectators vs. Stakeholders

Author

Listed:
  • Hande Erkut

    (Department of Economics, Maastricht University)

  • Daniele Nosenzo

    () (University of Nottingham, School of Economics)

  • Martin Sefton

    () (University of Nottingham, School of Economics)

Abstract

We investigate social norms for dictator game giving using a recently proposed norm-elicitation procedure (Krupka and Weber, 2013). We elicit norms separately from dictator, recipient, and disinterested third party respondents and find that elicited norms are stable and insensitive to the role of the respondent. The results support the use of this procedure as a method for measuring social norms.

Suggested Citation

  • Hande Erkut & Daniele Nosenzo & Martin Sefton, 2014. "Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games: Spectators vs. Stakeholders," Discussion Papers 2014-16, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  • Handle: RePEc:not:notcdx:2014-16
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, "undated". "Third Party Punishment and Social Norms," IEW - Working Papers 106, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    2. Simon Gächter & Daniele Nosenzo & Martin Sefton, 2013. "Peer Effects In Pro-Social Behavior: Social Norms Or Social Preferences?," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 548-573, June.
    3. Rustichini, Aldo & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2014. "Moral hypocrisy, power and social preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 107(PA), pages 10-24.
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    5. Croson, Rachel & Konow, James, 2009. "Social preferences and moral biases," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(3), pages 201-212, March.
    6. Erin L. Krupka & Roberto A. Weber, 2013. "Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games: Why Does Dictator Game Sharing Vary?," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(3), pages 495-524, June.
    7. Greiner, Ben, 2004. "An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments," MPRA Paper 13513, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Elster, Jon, 1989. "Social Norms and Economic Theory," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 99-117, Fall.
    9. Stephen V. Burks & Erin L. Krupka, 2012. "A Multimethod Approach to Identifying Norms and Normative Expectations Within a Corporate Hierarchy: Evidence from the Financial Services Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(1), pages 203-217, January.
    10. Erte Xiao & Daniel Houser, 2005. "Emotion expression in human punishment behavior," Experimental 0504003, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 18 May 2005.
    11. Daniel Houser & Erte Xiao, 2011. "Classification of natural language messages using a coordination game," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(1), pages 1-14, March.
    12. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Abigail Barr & Tom Lane & Daniele Nosenzo, 2015. "On the social appropriateness of discrimination," Discussion Papers 2015-25, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    2. Giuseppe Attanasi & Claire Rimbaud & Marie Claire Villeval, 2018. "Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion," Working Papers 1807, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    3. Hanna Fromell & Daniele Nosenzo & Trudy Owens & Fabio Tufano, 2017. "Are Victims Truly Worse Off in the Presence of Bystanders? Revisiting the Bystander Effect," Discussion Papers 2017-15, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    4. Gächter, Simon & Gerhards, Leonie & Nosenzo, Daniele, 2017. "The importance of peers for compliance with norms of fair sharing," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 72-86.
    5. D'Adda, Giovanna & Drouvelis, Michalis & Nosenzo, Daniele, 2016. "Norm elicitation in within-subject designs: Testing for order effects," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 1-7.
    6. Zarah Murad & Charitini Stavropoulou & Graham Cookson, 2018. "Incentives and Gender in a Multitask Setting: an Experimental Study with Real-Effort Tasks," Working Papers in Economics & Finance 2018-07, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth Business School, Economics and Finance Subject Group.
    7. repec:eee:pubeco:v:164:y:2018:i:c:p:153-164 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Sandra Polania-Reyes, 2016. "Disentangling Social Capital: Lab-in-the-Field Evidence on Coordination, Networks, and Cooperation," Artefactual Field Experiments 00565, The Field Experiments Website.
    9. Štěpán Veselý, 2015. "Elicitation of normative and fairness judgments: Do incentives matter?," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 10(2), pages 191-197, March.
    10. repec:eee:ecolet:v:168:y:2018:i:c:p:147-150 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    social norms; dictator games;

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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