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The "coy seller" problem: A market design to reveal willingness to trade

Author

Listed:
  • Apostolos Filippas

    (Gabelli School of Business, Fordham University, New York, New York, United States 10023)

  • John Horton

    (Sloan School of Management, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States 02142)

  • Sehar Noor

    (John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States 02138)

  • Dmitry Sorokin

    (Unafilliated)

Abstract

Buyers pursuing de facto unavailable sellers is a common source of inefficiency in matching markets. We describe an experimental intervention in an online labor market where workers could rent the right to signal higher capacity via a badge that simply said “Available Now.” This badge was visible to treated employers looking to hire, but not to control employers. We find strong evidence of positive worker selection into badge-renting, and that employers viewed that badge as informative and sought-out workers who rented the badge. We also consider the problem of pricing such a signal in equilibrium, and present evidence from a series of quasi-experiments.

Suggested Citation

  • Apostolos Filippas & John Horton & Sehar Noor & Dmitry Sorokin, 2022. "The "coy seller" problem: A market design to reveal willingness to trade," Working Papers 22-03, NET Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:net:wpaper:2203
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Amanda Pallais, 2013. "Inefficient Hiring in Entry-Level Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 18917, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Christopher T. Stanton & Catherine Thomas, 2016. "Landing the First Job: The Value of Intermediaries in Online Hiring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 83(2), pages 810-854.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Market design; online marketplaces; online experiments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • J32 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Nonwage Labor Costs and Benefits; Retirement Plans; Private Pensions
    • J40 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - General

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